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26. Dr. med. Mira Oberholzer-Gincburg, Nervenarzt, Utoquai 39, Zürich.
27. Dr. med. Emil Oberholzer, Nervenarzt, Utoquai 39, Zürich.
28. Dr. med. Charles Odier, Nervenarzt, 24 Boulevard des Philosophes, Genève.
29. Albert Peter, Primarlehrer, Eidmattstrasse 29, Zürich.
30. Hans Pfenninger, Pfarrer, Neftenbach, Zürich.
31. Dr. phil. Oskar Pfister, Pfarrer, Schienhutgasse 6, Zürich.
32. Priv.-Doz. Dr. phil. Jean Piaget, Inst. J.J. Rousseau, Taconnerie 5, Genève.
33. Dr. med. Philipp Sarasin, Nervenarzt, St. Jakobstrasse 14, Basel.
34. Dr. med. Raymond de Saussure, Tertasse 2, Genève.
35. Dr. med. Hans Jakob Schmid, Leysin, Waadt.
36. Professor Dr. phil. Ernst Schneider Wisby-Prospekt 14, Riga.
37. Direktor Hermann Tobler, Landerziehungsheim Hof-Oberkirch, Kaltbrunn, St. Gallen.
38. Stud. med. Arnold Weber, Belpstrasse 11, Bern.
39. Privatdozent Dr. med. Gustav Adolf Wehrli, Leonhardstrasse 1, Zürich.
40. Hans Zulliger, Oberlehrer, Ittigen bei Bern.

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R. Brun; E. Oberholzer, *President*; O. Pfister, *Vice-President*; Ph. Sarasin; R. de Saussure.

Advisory Committee

E. Blum, R. Brun, A. Kielholz, E. Oberholzer, O. Pfister.

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VIENNA PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Fourth Quarter, 1923

October 17, 1923. General Meeting.

October 31, 1923. Short communications.

- a. Dr. Reich: Introspection in a case of schizophrenia.
- b. Dr. Bernfeld: Magitot's membrane.
- c. Dr. Reik: The unconscious sense of guilt.

November 14, 1923. Short communications.

- a. Dr. Varendonck (guest of the Society): Silberer's threshold-symbolism.
- b. Dr. Friedjung: The Oedipus complex in the fever-delirium of a nine-year-old girl.
- c. Dr. Hitschmann: Impotence.

November 28, 1923. Dr. Reich: Genitality.

December 12, 1923. Dr. Fokschaner: Poetical composition during analysis.

List of Members, December 31, 1923

1. August Aichhorn, Wien, V., Schönbrunnerstrasse 112.
2. Lou Andreas-Salomé, Göttingen, Herzberger Landstrasse 101.
3. Dr. Siegfried Bernfeld, Wien, XIII., Suppégasse 10.
4. Dozent Dr. Felix Deutsch, Wien, I., Wollzeile 33.
5. Dr. Helene Deutsch, Wien, I., Wollzeile 33.
6. Dr. Paul Federn, Wien, I., Riemerg. 1.
7. Dr. Otto Fenichel, zurzeit Berlin-Halensee, Johann-Georg-Strasse.
8. Dr. Walter Fokschaner, Wien, VI., Kasernengasse 2.
9. Anna Freud, Wien, IX., Berggasse 19.
10. Prof. Dr. Sigm. Freud, Wien, IX., Berggasse 19.
11. Dozent Dr. Josef Friedjung, Wien, I., Elzendorferstrasse 6.
12. Dr. H. v. Hattingberg, München, Ainmillergasse 62.
13. Eric Hiller, Wien, VII., Andreasgasse 3.
14. Dr. Eduard Hitschmann, Wien, IX., Währingerstrasse 24.
15. Dr. Wilhelm Hoffer, Wien, IX., Liechtensteinstrasse 65a.
16. Prof. Dr. Guido Holzknacht, Wien, I., Liebiggasse 4.
17. Dr. Hermine Hug-Hellmuth, Wien, IX., Lustkandlgasse 10.
18. Dr. Ludwig Jekels, Wien, IX., Bergg. 29.
19. Dr. Robert Hans Jockl, Wien, III., Sechskrügelgasse 2.
20. Dr. Michael Kaplan, Wien, XVIII., Cottagegasse 48.
21. Dr. Salomea Kempner, Berlin W. 30, Barbarossastrasse 32, II.
22. Prof. Dr. Levi-Bianchini, Nocera Inferiore (Salerno).
23. Dr. Karl Landauer, Frankfurt a. M., Kettenhofweg 17.
24. Dr. I. Marcinowski, Bad Heilbrunn, Isartalbahn, Bayern.
25. Dr. Richard Nepaliek, Wien, VIII., Alserstrasse 41.
26. Dr. H. Nunberg, Wien, VIII., Florianigasse 20.
27. Prof. Dr. Otto Pözl, Prag, Psychiatrische Klinik.
28. Beate Rank, Wien, I., Grünangerg. 3-5.
29. Dr. Otto Rank, Wien, I., Grünangerg. 3-5.
30. Dr. Wilhelm Reich, Wien, XIX., Barawitzkagasse 12.
31. Dr. Theodor Reik, Wien, IX., Lackierergasse 12.
32. Dr. Oskar Rie, Wien, III., Estegasse 5.
33. Dr. I. Sadger, Wien, IX., Liechtensteinstrasse 15.
34. Dozent Dr. Paul Schilder, Wien, II., Taborstrasse 11.
35. M.-U.-C. Walter Schmideberg, Berlin W., Rauchstrasse 4.
36. Eugenia Sokolnicka, Paris VI., rue de l'Abbé Gregoire 3.
37. Dr. Maxim Steiner, Wien, I., Rotenturmstrasse 19.
38. A. J. Storfer, Wien, IX., Porzellangasse 43.
39. Frieda Teller, Prag, III., Plaska 14.
40. Dr. Karl Weiss, Wien, IV., Schwindg. 12.
41. Dr. Eduardo Weiss, Trieste, S. Lazzaro 8.
42. Dr. Alfred Winterstein, Wien, I., Augustinerstrasse 12.
Dr. Bernfeld.

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ABSTRACTS

GENERAL

Karl Abraham. Psycho-Analytic Views on some Characteristics of Early Infantile Thinking. *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 1923, Vol. III, p. 283.

This is a translation of a paper read by the author before the International Congress of Psychology at Oxford, on July 31, 1923. Psycho-analysis has shown that thinking in early childhood is influenced by instinct. Laying stress on the importance of the oral stage of infantile development, Abraham points out that to the child at this stage the outside world consists of objects which he wishes to incorporate in himself, the ego being more important than the object world. This is simply a matter of pleasure and pain. In adults consciousness moderates instinctual life. When two objects excite feelings of pleasure or pain in the child's mind he identifies them. As an example the case of a child is quoted who identifies a hot stove with a biting dog. Analogous thought processes are found among primitive races, and this primitive form of thinking persists in myths, fairy tales, and dreams. As the child grows older he naturally becomes conscious of the imaginary character of this process of thinking by identification. The gradual establishment of differentiation in thinking is motivated by the child's narcissism. The common identification of parents with animals is analogous to the animal-totemism found in primitive races. The later desire to possess and master the object includes a tendency to preserve and protect it, and paves the way to adaptation of thought to reality. At this stage narcissism is still paramount and the child invests his desires and thoughts with unlimited omnipotence. These ideas of omnipotence subsequently become displaced on to the idea of authority which is represented in the father or God. Phantasy is an important source of gratification to the child, logical thinking gradually replacing this pleasure-giving form of play. In conclusion, the author emphasises the importance of infantile instincts in the evolution of thought. Instincts are earlier than thought in the evolution of the individual and the race. It is therefore impossible to account correctly for any mental phenomenon without analysing its instinctual determination.

Robert M. Riggall.

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Ernest Jones. The Classification of the Instincts. *The British Journal of Psychology, General Section*, 1924, Vol. XIV, Part 3, p. 256.

The author complains that the many theoretical classifications, old and new, whatever their merits, have never been tested by application to the instinctual manifestations of the individual. Freud's division of the

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instincts into (a) sexual, and (b) ego, is based on psychological investigations; it coincides with their biological distinction. Psycho-analysis has resolved many of the instincts still regarded as primary into their elements, and has studied the inter-relationship and fate of these elements. Jones proposes as a working scheme a division of all instinctual manifestations into those of attraction and repulsion. The first would include hunger and sexuality, and in the second group (all ego manifestations) are placed aversion, flight, and hostility.

M. D. Eder.

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James Drever. The Classification of the Instincts. *The British Journal of Psychology, General Section*, 1924, Vol. XIV, Part 3, p. 248.

The author would define instinct as behaviour 'forms' controlled by an inner compulsion. He suggests a classification based on three psychological characters: (1) relative specificity, (2) appetition and reaction, (3) relation to emotion. A brief discussion of these characteristics leads to the following classification: (1) general and specific, (2) under each head, into appetitive and reactive, (3) under the last head into simple and emotional. This classification embodies many of the distinctions proposed by other psychologists.

M. D. Eder.

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Paul Schilder. Das Unbewusste. *Zeitschrift für die gesamten Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 1922. Bd. 80.

The author examines the psychic unconscious from various angles. He considers its relation to the sense-organs and its function of objectivity (*Gegenstandsfunktion*), and he discusses the part it plays in the impressions produced by experiences undergone by the subject, and in 'that form of automatism which assumes bodily shape'. He is evidently thinking throughout only of the physical, the non-psychic. Further, he touches on the unconscious as shown at work in various psychic experiences: in actual experience, in experiences on a lower level of consciousness, in the Freudian unconscious (in the systematic sense), and in the forgotten past. According to Schilder all these psychic experiences are conscious, though 'in a peculiar mode' which he calls 'spheric' (*sphärisch*): 'It will be seen that I uphold the thesis which, according to Freud, is untenable, namely, that everything psychic is conscious'.

The author does not call in question the individual facts from which was deduced the psycho-analytical concept of the unconscious (= the repressed). On the contrary, he asserts: 'The sphere is identical with Freud's system U_{bw}'. When, as here, a writer recognizes the individual facts which form the basis of a certain theory, yet regarding a given phenomenon from a different point of view, reduces to a different formula

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the subject of his observation, we require that the new theory shall demonstrate its right to existence. If fresh heuristic possibilities or practical consequences can be indicated they may be accepted as adequate proof.

Schilder's exposition of the unconscious is largely based, in so far as he deals with the unconscious in the psycho-analytical sense at all, on investigations into the evolution of thought. He posits that all thought is the result of a biological disposition, that is to say, of an instinct. From the purely phenomenological standpoint he describes the mode of existence (*Gegebenheitsweise*) of all that is objective as follows: 'Every image, everything objective, lies in a sphere which comprehends all that is essentially similar to, or partially identical with, that object. Further, in that sphere is included everything which has at any time by virtue of our individual experience approximated in time or space to that object. That which appertains to an image or a concept may be designated its sphere. Every experience will in the first instance evoke a response in the sphere as a whole. . . . Every thought, every image which emerges, follows an intention (*Intention*), a biological disposition. The sphere indicates roughly the general trend of that disposition; the finished concept corresponds to an ultimate biological goal. . . . Where hindrances to the attainment of such biological goals present themselves the intention remains confined within the sphere, never reaching its proper goal, but only one which is associatively akin to it'. Here we have the correct translation into terms of phenomena of the processes of repression and displacement.

It follows from this that repression in Freud's sense would have the additional function of inhibiting the development of thought; thought would remain on the most primitive level, i.e. embedded in the sphere. Thus, for example, a repressed name might yet be represented in consciousness by the feeling of having it 'on the tip of one's tongue'. In such a case the analyst says that the name is repressed in the systematic sense, that is to say, unconscious, and against this statement no objection could be urged. Nor can exception be taken to the assumption that traces of a thought which fully unfolds itself only after many hours of analysis did already exist at a very early stage in the process. We may assume, too, that patients of some practice in self-observation could communicate to us much more of the content of their consciousness from moment to moment. One has been able quite plainly to discover in one's own analysis how in moments of apparent absence of thought the field of vision of one's consciousness is full of odds and ends, sketchy outlines and beginnings of thoughts which one can but seldom get hold of. Thus we are bound to admit that the scope of consciousness is wider than a superficial self-observation would lead us to suppose. But Schilder takes a very bold step when, basing his statements on this fact, he postulates by analogy the consciousness of all mental processes regarded, as it were, not merely in

cross-section, but in longitudinal section also. How does he picture to himself the *contemporaneous* conscious existence in the mind of all past experience? It is precisely this question which we should like to have seen answered in this paper. We know that it was this problem of the latent psychic content which led to the introduction of the concepts subconscious, co-conscious, etc., in non-analytical psychology, and to the postulate of a preconscious and unconscious in psycho-analytical theory.

What the author himself has to say on this question is highly obscure: 'Are we then to suppose that the past is in consciousness at all and, if so, by what is it represented? I know that the assumption that everything past exists in the background of experience, on the margin, seems strained, nevertheless, for reasons into which I cannot here go in detail, I believe it to be the truest. Conscious experience, too, is indestructible; as psycho-analysis shows, it can return unchanged into full consciousness. From this we might infer that the past exists on the deepest level of consciousness and not after the manner of the sphere (?). Nevertheless, the past constantly sends forth derivatives into the sphere, so that every experience has, as it were, a double representation—that which pertains to the sphere (in the preconscious) and that which pertains to a low level of consciousness, in the preconscious'.

Now what is the heuristic value of this assumption? So far from being valuable, the attempt to conceive of the psycho-analytical unconscious phenomenologically as conscious is bound to lead to that confusion which psycho-analysis has obviated by proposing the concept of the 'unconscious'—a fact emphasized by Freud in the discussion which followed when at a meeting an account was given of this work of Schilder's.

The unconscious, as such, cannot be comprehended; all Freud's proofs of the existence of the psychic unconscious are indirect (post-hypnotic suggestion, discontinuity of consciousness, ignorance of the origin and aim of symptoms, infantile amnesia, etc.). The postulate of a psychic unconscious is according to Freud 'entirely legitimate and necessary'. Schilder's attempt to rescue Freud's conception of the unconscious from the claws of critical objections by assigning to that conception a peculiar *conscious* mode of existence has miscarried, and moreover, cannot be maintained. No doubt he does not in general underestimate the importance of the psycho-analytical unconscious, but in the interests of this notion of his he certainly has done so in this work. The problem of symbol-formation is only touched upon, and the question of the nature and effect of the primal scene (*Urszene*), one of the most important in the whole analytical theory of the unconscious, is not mentioned.

The fact of physiological forgetting being indispensable to the economics of thought stands in diametrical opposition to Schilder's postulate.

Schilder certainly does not question the fact that unconscious wishes and fears can find expression in conversion-symptoms. We cannot,

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however, suppose that the psychic import of 'organ-speech' is in the patient's consciousness in any form whatsoever.

Quite recently psycho-analytical research and theory have shown a tendency to expand the realm of the unconscious; the boundaries between the somatic and the unconscious-psychic are disappearing, and the belief that 'organic processes must be regarded as in essence the same as instinctual mechanisms' follows from the new knowledge and conjectures—penetrating, as they do, into the depths of the human mind. But even this view of Schilder's, which we should be glad to share, contradicts the statement: 'All that is mental is also conscious'.

The discussion of the evolution of thought is of interest to the psycho-analyst. This discussion is the sequel to a former work of Schilder's.¹ In this a piece of formal psychology has been evolved on a basis of the analytical psychology of instinct and the views of the phenomenologists. But it seems dangerous to try to effect a union between the phenomenological, psycho-analytical, and biological points of view, if it must be at the cost of valuable theoretical formulations. We should have esteemed it an important addition to our theoretical notions, if Schilder had contented himself with demonstrating that in the light of more subtle, so to speak, histological considerations a piece of unconscious material can be proved to have a conscious existence.

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Wilhelm Reich.

H. Tasman Lovell. Psycho-Analysis in Relation to Traditional Psychology. *Australian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy*, 1923, Vol. I, p. 93.

This is intended as a criticism of psycho-analysis from the viewpoint of traditional psychology. One of the first duties of a critic, however, should be to make himself thoroughly conversant with the subject he wishes to criticise. This Professor Lovell has not done in regard to psycho-analysis, for his paper abounds in inexact and loose usage of Freud's terminology, and in many misconceptions of the principles involved. It will be necessary to point out a few only of the inaccuracies and misconceptions to make further reference to the paper unnecessary.

He attributes to Freud such expressions as 'the resistance or censor of consciousness', 'wishes return to consciousness by distorting themselves'.

Conflict and repression are not understood, as the following passages show, 'a conflict of desires is a conflict of enlightened impulses'. 'There is the third course, taken by the strong, namely, to confront the conflict and endure its agony until frank and fearless thought has fully examined its

¹ 'Über Gedankenentwicklung,' *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 1921.

whole meaning and clear reasons have been found for rejection of the incompatible impulse'.

Warburton Brown.

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William Calwell. Some Observations on the Scientific Aspect of Freud's Psychology. *The Medical Press*, April 9, 1924, pp. 296-98.

Dr. Calwell has here made the effort to take up an unbiassed attitude to the Freudian psychology, but he has not succeeded in penetrating deep enough to grasp the essential truths of the principles involved in psycho-analysis.

He states that Freud conforms to scientific requirements in the methods of his work, that he has collected an enormous number of facts, and has constructed and named laws to explain these facts. The question he asks is, Do these facts bear the interpretation Freud puts upon them?

It is pointed out that Freud is strictly deterministic in his attitude to mind, and that he pushes this to its utmost logical conclusions. In regard to heredity Freud's attitude that ontogeny epitomises phylogeny in the psyche as well as anatomically is supported by his findings. In discussing the theory of the unconscious an effort is made to correlate the development of the higher centres in the brain with inhibitions of the primitive impulses psychologically. Thus repression develops and conflict is but a step.

Freud's explanation of dreams, however, raises the author's scepticism to its zenith. To him Freud's methods do not seem scientific, and it is highly improbable that the young human mind can possess all the 'symbolism' paraphernalia supposed to be formed there. On the other hand, he admits that the conduct and words of a young lady most carefully brought up, under the influence of an acute psychosis, reveal possibilities which may well make us hesitate to deny the possibility of Freud's assertions.

Warburton Brown.

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J. P. Lawson. Freud or Rivers. *Australian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy*, 1923, Vol. I, p. 111.

A short criticism of Rivers' book, *Conflict and Dream*. Rivers' views on the origin of dreams in current conflicts, his dissension from Freud's view of the dream being a wish fulfilment, and his opinion that it was not necessary to assume a censorship in the mind are discussed.

Professor Lawson quotes from Freud to show that in regard to the origin of dreams he includes in his views the facts of which Rivers makes use, but also insists on a further essential factor (the repressed wish) which the latter does not take into account.

Freud's views in regard to the censorship are upheld.

The writer, in paying tribute to Rivers, states that in all probability he would have modified his views had he lived to revise his book.

Warburton Brown.

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First Quarter, 1924

January 2, 1924. Dr. S. Ferenczi (guest of the Society) : Supplementary remarks on *Entwicklungsziele der Psychoanalyse*.

January 16, 1924. Dr. Theodor Reik : Psycho-analysis of religious dogma.

January 30, 1924. Dr. Siegfried Bernfeld : Laughter, weeping, and terror.

February 15, 1924. Short communications :

a. Dr. Hitschmann : On the theory of dreams.

b. Dr. Reich : Difficulty in an analysis.

c. Dr. Schilder : Cocaine maniacs.

February 27, 1924. Miss Caroline Newton (guest of the Society) : The application of psycho-analysis to organizations for social welfare.

March 12, 1924. Dr. Robert Wälde (guest of the Society) : Mechanisms of the psychoses and their accessibility to influence.

March 26, 1924. Dr. H. Nunberg : The will to be well.

Election of new Member : Miss Caroline Newton, of Philadelphia, then resident in Vienna.

REPORT OF THE EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL CONGRESS (*continued*)

Dr. Siegfried Bernfeld, Vienna : Criticism of the Manner in which Psycho-Analysis has hitherto been applied to Pedagogics.

The speaker intends not so much to level criticisms at the activity in this field as, instead, to point to a few important tasks which await workers. Up to the present those interested in pedagogics have applied those results of psycho-analysis which seemed adapted to further the interests they had at heart. If it is desired to apply the science of psycho-analysis to pedagogics, pedagogics must first be regarded psycho-analytically—in the widest sense of the word, pedagogy denotes the sum of the reactions of adult society to the fact of ontogenetic development. The attempt must be made to regard from an analytic standpoint the motives of education in general, the mental conditioning factors of the educational methods of the present day, the types of pedagogic ideologues, rationalizations and educationalist views, as has already been done successfully with other civilized institutions, e.g. religion, literature, etc.

This scientific task can be more fully considered. The attitude of pedagogues to practical questions requires correction on many points. The most important is that psycho-analysis gives us no occasion to regard childhood as a period of particular plasticity; it shows, on the contrary, that the younger the person the more he is bound by inflexible inherited and instinctual trends, the less he is accessible to influence. One of the main

foundations of pedagogic optimism is thus destroyed. The optimism of educationalists, among them many versed in psycho-analysis, is a symptom that this group of persons opposes, perhaps with greater stubbornness than others, the limitations of narcissism which are the unavoidable consequence of advancing psycho-analytical knowledge. Psycho-analysis renders possible only a pessimistic pedagogy; of which the speaker sees a glimmering foreshadowed in psycho-analytic knowledge concerning collective (group) phenomena.

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