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26. Dr. med. Mira Obmich-Gruber, Neuermarkt, Unterweg 39, Zürich.
27. Dr. med. Emil Obmich, Neuermarkt, Unterweg 39, Zürich.
29. Albert Peter, Pfundsachfer, Rennstrasse 70, Zürich.
30. Hans Pfeiffer, Pfister, Hertenbach, Zürich.
31. Dr. phil. Oskar Pfeffer, Pfister, Schänzliweg 4, Zürich.
33. Dr. med. Philipp Sassin, Neuermarkt, St. Jakobstrasse 14, Basel.
34. Dr. med. Raymond de Sausser, Turgen 3, Geneva.
35. Dr. med. Hans Jakob Schmidt, Lepin, Wandschitz.
36. Prof. Dr. phil. Ernst Schmidt-Wysky-Prospalt 4, Zürich.
37. Dr. med. Hermann Schütz, Landschulheim Hof-Cöthen, Kaltenbrunn, St. Gallen.

Council
H. Brun; E. Obmich, President; O. Pfeffer, Vice-President; H. Schlüer; R. de Sausser.

Advisory Committee
E. Brun, H. Brun, A. Lutti, J. Obmich, O. Pfeffer.

VIENNA PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY
Fourth Quarter, 1923

October 12, 1923, General Meeting.

October 15, 1923, Short communications.

a. Dr. Reich: Phrenology: an evidence of schizophrenia.

b. Dr. Hirschmann: Magistrat's memorandum.

c. Dr. Reich: The unconscious sense of guilt.

November 14, 1923, Short communications.

a. Dr. Vardenbach: The Oedipus complex in the neurosis of a nine-year-old girl.

b. Dr. Hirschmann: Impotence.

November 18, 1923, Dr. Reich: Genitality.

December 12, 1923, Dr. Pfeffer: Poetic composition from the analysis.

List of Members, December 31, 1923

1. August Achtert, Wien, V. Schubertstrasse 112.
3. Dr. Siegfried Breithold, Wien, XIII., Rohrgasse 10.
5. Dr. Leo Deutsch, Wien, I., Watlerl 31.
6. Dr. Paul Fischer, Wien, I., Kienberg 1.
7. Dr. Otto Fuchs, current Berlin-Mahagen, Johanna-Georg-Straße.
8. Dr. Walter Fuchsner, Wien, VI., Kastanienweg 2.
10. Prof. Dr. Sigis. Fuchs, Wien, I., Berggasse 17.
11. Dr. Josef Fuchs, Wien, I., Berggasse 19.
12. Dr. H. v. Hattingburg, München, Altenburg 64.
14. Dr. Eduard Hilschmann, Wien, IX., Wintergartenstrasse 42.
15. Dr. Wilhelm Hoffer, Wien, IX., Landstrasse 69a.
18. Dr. Ludwig Jakob, Wien, IX., Deeg 29.
22. Prof. Dr. Leo Kastner, No. 1, Altenburg 4.
24. Dr. I. Marowska, Bad Heilbronne, Lauterbach, Bayreuth.
27. Prof. Dr. Otto Netter, Prague, Psychologische Klinik.
30. Dr. Wilhelm Reit, Wien, XIX., Reinhardstrasse 12.
31. Dr. Theodor Reit, Wien, XII., Linzerstrasse 12.
32. Dr. Oskar Rie, Wien, XIII., Rezension 5.
33. Dr. I. Segré, Wien, IX., Linzerstrasse 15.
34. Dr. Paul Schäfer, Wien, II., Taborsstrasse 12.
39. Dr. Karl Steiner, Prague III., Praga 13.
40. Dr. Alfred Stolper, Wien, IV., Schusterl. 12.
41. Dr. Eduard Wiener, Tübingen, S. Lauten 1.
42. Dr. Alfred Wiener, Wien, I., Augustinergasse 12.
43. Dr. Bernfeld.
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This is a translation of a paper read by the author before the International Congress of Psychology at Oxford, on July 31, 1913. Psycho-analytic has shown that thinking in early childhood is influenced by instinct. Laying stress on the importance of the oral stage of infantile development, Abraham points out that to the child at this stage the outside world consists of objects which he wishes to incorporate in himself, the ego being more important than the object world. This is simply a matter of pleasure and pain. In adult consciousness modern society instills in them. As an example the case of a child is quoted who identifies a hot stove with a barking dog. Analogue thought processes are found among primitive races and this primitive form of thinking persists in many fairy tales and dreams. As the child grows older he naturally becomes conscious of the imaginary character of this process of thinking by symbolization. The gradual establishment of differentiation in thinking is not influenced by the child's naivete. The constant identification of parents with oneself is analogous to the animal-inheritance found in primitive man. The later desire to possess and master the object includes a tendency to preserve and protect it, and gives the way to elaboration of thought to reality. At this stage knowledge is still confused and the child devotes his desires and thoughts with unlimited omnipotence. These ideas of omnipotence subsequently become displaced on to the idea of a certain object which is represented in the father of God. Thinking is an important source of gratification to the child, logical thinking gradually replacing this pleasure-getting form of play. In conclusion, the author emphasizes the importance of infantile instinct in the evolution of thought. Instincts are earlier than thought in the evolution of the individual and the race. It is therefore impossible to account correctly for any mental phenomena without analyzing its instinctual determination.

* Robert M. Biggus.


The author complains that the many theoretical classifications, old and new, whatever their merits, have never been tested by application to the instinctual manifestations of the individual. Freud's division of the general instinct into (a) sexual, and (b) aggressive, is based on psychological investigations. It coincides with their biological distinction. Psycho-analysis has revealed many of the instincts still regarded as primary into their elements, and has studied the inter-relationship and fate of these elements. Jones proposes as a working scheme a division of all instinctual manifestations into those of attraction and repulsion. The first would include hunger and sensuality, and in the second group (all ego manifestations) are placed assertion, flight, and hostility.

* M. D. Edler.


The author would define instinct as behaviour' forces controlled by the instincts. He recognizes a classification based on these psychological characteristics: (1) relative specificities; (2) irritability and resistance; (3) emotional classification. A brief discussion of these characteristics leads to the following classification: (1) general and specific, (2) idiosyncratic and reactive, (3) central and parasympathetic, (4) under the last head into simple and complex. This classification explains many of the distinctions proposed by other psychologists.

* M. D. Edler.

Paul Schilder, Das Unbewusste. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 1921, Bd. 76.

The author examines the psychic unconscious as an engine. He considers the relation to the sense-organs and its function of objectivity (instinctual-physis). He discusses the part it plays in the impression formed by experience undergone by the subject, and in that form of thought which assumes bodily shape. He is essentially thinking of the sense-organs as the field of work in various psychic experiences: in actual experience, in experience on a lower level of consciousness, in the Freudian unconscious (in the systematic sense), and in the forgotten past. According to Schilder all these psychic experiences are conscious, though in a peculiar mode which he calls 'aphasia' (aphasic). He will be able to see that I am actuated by a principle which, according to Freud, is untenable, namely, that everything psychic is conscious.

The author does not call in question the individual facts from which the general psychic concept of the unconscious (= the representation). On the contrary, he assumes the 'sphere is identical with Freud's inner world.' While, as a basis, a writer recognizes the individual facts which form the basis of a certain theory, yet requiring a given phenomenon from a different point of view, reduces to a different formula.
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the subject of his observation, we require that the new theory shall demonstrate its right to existence. If fresh heuristic possibilities or practical consequences can be indicated they may be accepted as adequate proof.

Schiller's exposition of the unconscious is happily broad, in so far as he deals with the unconscious in the psychoanalytical sense at all, on investigate into the evolution of thought. He points out that all thought is the result of a biological disposition, which is due, of an instinct. From the purely phenomenological standpoint he describes the mode of utterance (phenomenology) of all that is objective as follows: Every image of everything is a concept of the sphere as whole. . . Every thought, every image which emerges, follows as an utterance (translation), a biological disposition. The sphere in question roughly the general trend of that disposition; the folded concept corresponds to an ultimate biological goal. . . Where handicaps to the attainment of such biological goals present themselves the intention remains confined within the sphere, never reaching its proper goal, but only one which is necessarily aimed to it. Here we have the correct translation into terms of pleasantness of the process of repression and displacement.

It follows from this that repression in Freud's sense would have the additional function of inhibiting the development of thought. Thought would remain on the most primitive level, i.e. embedded in the sphere. Then, for example, a repressed sound might be represented in consciousness by the feeling of having it on the tip of one's tongue. In such a case the subject says that the name is repressed in the unconscious, that it is not conscious, and against this statement no objections would be urged. Nor can exceptions be taken to the assumption that more of a thought which fully unifies itself only after many hours of analysis did already exist at a very early stage in the process. We may assume, too, that patterns of some process in self-observation could communicate to us much more of the content of these conscious processes than meets the eye. One has been able quite readily to discover in one's own analyses how moments of apparent absence of thought the field of visions of one's consciousness is full of sounds and words, fleeting images and bagatelles of thoughts which one had only just received. From this we may conclude that the scope of consciousness is wider than a superficial self-observation would lead us to suppose. But Schiller's name materializes that fact, bearing the statement on this, he postulates by analogy the consciousness of all mental processes regarded, as it were, not merely in cross-section, but in longitudinal sections also. How does he picture to himself the contemporaneous consciousness existing in the mind of all past experience? In his theory, this question which might, we should like to have more answers to in this paper. We know that it was this problem of the latent psychic content which led to the introduction of the concepts sub-consciousness, etc., in neo-analytical psychology, and to the problem of a psychosomatics and unconsciousness in psycho-analytical theory.

What the author himself has to say on this question is highly obscure. "Are we to suppose that the past is unconscious or all and, if so, by what is it repressed?" I know that this assumption that everything past exists in the background of experience, on the margin, never noticed, can be under the tension of consciousness.

General experience, too, is indubitable; as psychoanalytical evidence, it can return exchanged into full consciousness. From this we might infer that the past exists in the deepest level of consciousness and not after the manner of the sphere (?). Nevertheless, the past constantly sends forth vibrations into the sphere, so that every experience has, as it were, a double representation—what pertains to the sphere (is in the conscious) and that which pertains to a low level of consciousness, to the unconscious."

Now what is the heuristic value of this assumption? So far as being valuable, the attempt to conceive of the psychoanalytical unconscious, phenomenologically as conscious is bound to lead to that conclusion which psycho-analysis has elaborated by proposing the concept of the unconscious—"a fact expressed by Freud in the discussion which followed when at a meeting on account was given of this work of Schilder's."

The unconscious, as such, cannot be comprehended; all Freud's proofs of the existence of the psychic unconscious are indirect (hypnotic suggestion, discontinuity of consciousness, ignorance of the origin and sum of symptoms, habitable instincts, etc.). The notion of a psychic unconscious is according to Freud 'entirely legitimate and necessary'. Schilder's attempt to rescue Freud's concept of the unconscious from the claws of critical objections by assigning to that concept a peculiar conscious mode of existence has returned, and moreover, cannot be maintained. No doubt he does not in general understand the importance of the psychoanalytical unconscious, but the import of this notion of his has become clear in his work. The problem of psychic inhibition is only touched upon, and the notion of the nature and effect of the psychic situation (dreams, one of the most important in the whole analytical theory of the unconscious, not considered."

The fact of physiological forgetting being indispensable to the economy of thought stands in diametrical opposition to Schilder's postulates.

Schilder certainly does not question the fact that unconscious wishes and forces can find expression in conversion symptoms. We cannot,
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however, suppose that the psychic impact of 'organ-speech' is the patient's compensation in any form whatever.

Quite recently psycho-analytical research and theory have shown a tendency to expand the limits of the unconscious: the boundaries between the conscious and the unconscious psychic are disappearing, and the belief that 'organic processes must be regarded as in essence the same as individual mechanisms' follows from the new knowledge and experience -preparing, as they do, into the depths of the human soul. But even this view of Schickardt's, which we should be glad to share, contradicts the statement:

'All that is mental is also conscious'.

The discussion of the essence of thought is of interest to the psycho-analyst. This discussion is the sequel to a former work of Schickardt. In this aspect, the theme of 'mental processes have been evolved as a basis of the analytical psychology of instinct and the views of the phenomenological, psycho-analytical, and biological points of view, if it must be at the cost of valuable theoretical formulations. We should have esteemed it an important item in our theoretical position, if Schickardt had continued himself with demonstrating that in the light of more data, so in speak, the psychological considerations he practical material can be proved to have a conscious existence.'

Wolfgang Reich


This is intended as a criticism of psycho-analysis from the viewpoint of traditional psychology. One of the first attacks of a critic, however, to criticize. This Professor Lowel has not done in regard to psychism and psychology, and in this respect the criticism of the principles involved, it will be necessary to point out a few of the inconsistencies and misconceptions to make further reference to the paper unnecessary.

He attributes to Freud such expressions as 'the resistance or center of consciousness', 'wish return to consciousness by disturbing thoughts'.

Conflict and repression are not understood, as the following passage shows, 'a conflict of desires is a conflict of enlightened impulses'. This is the third course, taken by the string, namely, to confound the conflict and endow its agency until Frank and Kevan thought has fully examined in

"Das UnbewuBte Konzept. " Ztschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie, 1924.

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when reading and close seems have been found he injection of the unconscious impulse'.

Warburton Brown


Dr. Cawell has thus laid the effort to take up an unbiased attitude to the Freudian psychology, but he has not succeeded in penetrating deep enough to grasp the essential truths of the principles involved in psychosanalysis.

He states that Freud confuses scientific requirements in the methods of his work, that he has collected an enormous number of facts, and has constructed and named laws to explain these facts. The question he asks is, do these facts bear the explanation Freud puts upon them?

It is pointed out that Freud is strictly determinate in his attitude toward the mind, and that he pushes this to its utmost logical conclusion. In regard to this, Freud's attitude that humanity epitomizes psychology in the psyche as well as externally supported by his analogy. In discussing the theory of the unconscious an effort is made to correlate the development of the higher centres in the brain with instinctive and the primitive impulses psychologically. Thus repression develops and conflict is in a step. Freud's explanation of the same, however, raises the author's appreciation to its merit. To him Freud's methods do not seem scientific, and it is highly improbable that the young human mind can possess all the 'symbolisms' parabolically supposed to be formed. On the other hand, he admits that the context and words of a young human mind are brought up, under the influence of an acute psychosis, reveal possibilities which may well make us hesitate to deny the possibility of Freud's somnambulism.

Warburton Brown.


A short criticism of Rivers' book, Conflict and Dream. Rivers' views on the origins of dreams in current conflicts, his distinction from Freud's view of the dream being a wish fulfillment, and his opinion that it was not necessary to assume a censorship in the mind are discussed.

Professor Lowes quotes from Freud to show that in regard to the origin of dreams he includes in his views the fact of which Rivers makes use, but also insists on a further essential factor (the repression with which the latter does not take into account.

Freud's views in regard to the censorship are upheld. The writer, in paying tribute to Rivers, states that, as an improbable he would have modified his views had he lived to revise his book.

Warburton Brown.

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VIENNA PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY
First Quarter, 1924
January 9, 1924, Dr. E. Pernici (guest of the Society): Supplemen-
tary remarks on "Endobiose: Psychologie der Psychopathien".
January 16, 1924, Dr. Theodor Reik: Psycho-analysis of religious
decadence.
January 23, 1924, Dr. Siegfried Bernfeld: Laughter, weeping, and
terror.
February 13, 1924: Short communications:
- Dr. Hirschmann: On the theory of dreams.
- Dr. Roth: Difficulty in an analysis.
- Dr. Schleser: Concrete woman.
February 27, 1924, Miss Caroline Newn (guest of the Society):
The application of psycho-analysis to organization for social welfare.
March 13, 1924, Dr. Robert Walter (guest of the Society): MECH-
nismes of the people and their accessibility to influence.
March 16, 1924, Dr. H. Neuberg: The soil to be well.
Election of new Member: Miss Caroline Newn, of Philadelphia, then
resident in Vienna.

REPORT OF THE EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-
ANALYTICAL CONGRESS (continued):
Dr. Siegfried Bernfeld, Vienna: Criticism of the manner in which Psycho-
Analysis has hitherto been applied to Pedagogics.
The speaker insists not so much in level criticisms of the activity in this
field as, instead, to point to a few important tasks which still remain
unaccomplished. In the present discussion, pedagogics have applied
these results of psychoanalysis which are still to be discovered in further fruitful
research. To date, psycho-analysis in pedagogics has not been regarded
psychologically in the wide sense of the word, pedagogy considers the aim of
the reeducation of adult society to the actual condition of the educational
system. The attempt must be made to regard from an analytic standpoint
the motives of education in general, the mental conditioning factors of the
educational methods of the present day, the type of pedagogic ideology,
and schools and educational views as has already been done successfully with other civilised institutions.
- e.g. religion, literature, etc.
This method can be more fully considered. The attitude of pedagogics to
practical questions requires correction in many points. The
most important is that psychoanalysis gives us no instruction in a period of particular plasticity; it shows, on the contrary, that
the younger the person the more he is bound by infelible nature and
instructed for life, the less he is accessible to influence. One of the main
foundations of pedagogic optimism is thus destroyed. The optimism
of scientificism, among them many trends in psycho-analysis, is a symptom
that this group of persons appears, perhaps with greater aridity than
others, the limitations of narcissism which are the inevitable consequence
of advancing psycho-analytical knowledge. Psycho-analysis renders possible only a precarious pedagogy, of which the speaker was a glimmering
foreshadow in psycho-analytical knowledge concerning collective
phenomena.